Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 76 | Issue 1

11-1-2000

The False Promise of the New Nondelegation
Doctrine
Mark Seidenfeld
Jim Rossi

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Recommended Citation
Mark Seidenfeld & Jim Rossi, The False Promise of the New Nondelegation Doctrine, 76 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1 (2000).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol76/iss1/1

This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.

Article 1

ESSAY

THE FALSE PROMISE OF THE "NEW"
NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE
Mark Seidenfeld :

&Jim7f Rossi**
In a remarkable recent decision, American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v.

EPA, a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
rejected the Environmental Protection Agency's ozone rules.1 The
decision, written per curiam by Judge Stephen Williams, is significant
because it brings to the fore a new twist on the nondelegation doctrine, reinvigorating a spirited debate that has engaged administrative
law scholars since the New Deal.2 Unlike the traditional nondelegation doctrine, which allows a court to declare a statute unconstitu* Professor, Florida State University College of Law. J.D., Stanford Law School,
1983.
** Patricia A. Dore Associate Professor, Florida State University College of Law.
LL.M., Yale Law School, 1994; J.D., University of Iowa College of Law, 1991. Thanks
to J.B. Ruhl and Ron Levin for comments on a previous draft of this Essay and to
Lakshman Gurusvamy and the FSU College of Law faculty for comments during a
faculty workshop at which Jim Rossi presented this paper.
1 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam), nodified and rei'g denied, 195 F.3d
4 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam), cert. grantedsub nom.Browner %,Am. TruckingAss'ns,
Inc., 120 S.Ct. 2003 (2000), and cert. granted,Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. Browner, 120 S.
Ct. 2193 (2000). Judge rflliams's opinion echoes his previous invalidation of safety
regulations in UAW v. OSHA (Lockout/Tagout I), 938 F.2d 1310, 1313 (D.C. Cir.
1991).
2 The debate has hardly passed into history. For example, a recent symposium
on the nondelegation doctrine, with contributions by Professors Dan Kahan, David
Schoenbrod, and Peter Schuck, among others, appears in volume 20 of the Cardouo

Law Review. See Dan M. Kahan, Democracy Sclmocracy, 20 QGuwozo L Rev. 795 (1999)
(arguing against the nondelegation doctrine as democracy enhancing); David
Schoenbrod, Democracy and Delegation:A Reply to .Ay Critics, 20 Cuozo L RE%. 731
(1999) (defending revival of the nondelegation doctrine); Peter H. Schuck, Delegation
and Democracy: Comments on David Schoenbrod, 20 GAruozo L REv,. 775 (1999) (rejecting Schoenbrod's proposal).

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[VOL- 76ax

tional if Congress has not provided an "intelligible principle" to guide
its delegation of authority to an agency, 3 Judge Williams's approach to
nondelegation does not require a court to pass judgment directly on
the constitutionality of a statute. Instead, under the "new" nondelegation doctrine endorsed in American Trucking, a court evaluates the validity of a statutory delegation based on whether the agency has
adopted an interpretation of the statute that provides adequate administrative standards to guide its exercise of discretion. 4

The normative basis for the new nondelegation doctrine, as
Judge Williams and others argue, is the promotion of the rule of law.5
As we set out below, however, the rule of law benefits of the new

nondelegation doctrine are no greater than those delivered by the
current, well-accepted means of political and judicial oversight of
agency action. At the same time, the rule of law is not the be-all and
end-all of regulatory systems. There are countervailing benefits to a
system that allows for regulatory flexibility; in fact, some degree of
flexibility is unavoidable. Those benefits are especially important
when evaluating the new nondelegation doctrine because that doctrine implements the rule of law only to a limited extent. The thesis
of this Essay is that the benefits of the new nondelegation doctrine in
promoting the values underlying the rule of law pale in comparison to
that doctrine's impact on agencies' abilities to address the particularities of many problems that they are statutorily assigned to remedy.
I. JUDICALLY ENFORCED Ex ANrE CONSTRAINTS OR Ex POST REVIEW?
In Amerfican Trucking, a panel of the D.C. Circuit considered the
EPA's revisions to national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for
ozone and small airborne particulate matter. 6 For primary NAAQS,
the Clean Air Act requires that the agency set such standards at a level
requisite to protect public health, leaving an adequate margin of
safety.7 Contrary to the implicit assumption underlying this statutory
provision, it is generally acknowledged that there are no certain "safe"
3

SeeJ.W. HamptonJr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928); see also

Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 418 (1935) (striking down a statutory
provision allowing the President to ban oil extracted in excess of quantities permitted
by state law because "Congress left the matter to the President without standard or
rule").
4

See Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1033.

5 See, e.g., id. at 1038; sources cited infra note 18.
6

See Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1034-40.

7 See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (1994).
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levels of ozone or small particles in the air.8 The D.C. Circuit has held
in several cases that the EPA may not take costs into account in deter-

mining NAAQS. 9 Hence, the level required by the statute depends
entirely on how the EPA interprets the term "the public health." 10 In
previous rulemaking proceedings, the EPA has set forth criteria for
determining NAAQS, considering the seriousness of adverse health
effects from violations of the standard, whether those effects are temporary or permanent, and the size of the sensitive population affected
by the violations." In revising the ozone NAAQS, the EPA also considered whether naturally-occurring levels of pollution at some places
in the nation might exceed the standard, which would render compli12
ance with the NAAQS impossible.
In American Trucking, the court rejected the EPA rulemaking on
the ground that, although the factors the EPA used to revise the
ozone and particulate NAAQS were relevant, the agency did not provide a precise description of how it took those factors into account in
setting ambient standards.' s Judge Williams did not merely reject the
8 See Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean AirAct Unconstitutional?,98 Nlica. L RE%. 303,
315 (1999) ("When it is said that a certain level of pollution is 'safe,' what is really
meant is that the residual risk is acceptable or tolerable-not that there is no risk at
all.").

9 SeeAm. Lung Ass'n v. EPA, 134 F.3d 388,389 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Am. Petroleum
Inst. v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176, 1185 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647
F.2d 1130, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
10 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1).
11 See National Primary and Secondary Ambient Air Standards for Lead, 40 C.F.R.
§ 50 (1999); see also National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Sulfur Dioxides, 40
C.F.R. § 50 (1999) (declining to revise the sulphur dioxide NAAQS to protect
asthmatics from short-term exposure); Letter from George T. Wolff, Chair of Clean
Air Scientific Advisory Committee, to Carol M. Brovner, EPA Administrator (June 1,
1994), reprinted in 59 Fed. Reg. 58,977, 58,978 (1994) (stating that a unanimous
CASAC recommendation that a short-term NAAQS for sulphur dioxide had not been
granted because "the effects [of such exposures] are short-term, readily reversible,
and typical of response seen with other stimuli"). In deciding to revise the ozone and
particulate matter NAAQS, the EPA similarly considered "the nature and severity of
the health effects involved, the size of the sensitive population(s) at risk, the tpes of
health information available, and the kind and degree of uncertainties that must be
addressed." Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1034-35 (quoting Ozone Final Rule, 40 C.F.R.
§ 50.10 (1997); EPA, REvw OF THE NATIONAL AuBIENT AIR QUALm STANDARDS FOR
PARncULATE MAT-r PoLicYAssEss.ua'r OF Sc mrrnc ,%ND TEcHNxrcL INFOR' rTO.N:
OAQPS STAFF PAPER at 11-2 (1996)).
12 See Am Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1059-60 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
13 See id. at 1057; id. at 1034 ("Although the factors EPA uses in determining the
degree of public health concern associated wvith different levels of ozone and PM are
reasonable, EPA appears to have articulated no 'intelligible principle' to channel its
application of these factors; nor is one apparent from the statute.").
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EPA's explanation of the revised standard as inadequately reasoned or
inadequately supported by evidence. Rather, he imposed on the EPA
the obligation that it interpret the Clean Air Act in a manner that
sufficiently constrains the agency in setting all NAAQS under the statute. 14 In short, Judge Williams's opinion hints that the EPA would
have to specify a formula by which it would have to evaluate the effect
of ambient air pollution on the public health that would definitively

specify how the EPA factors every type of health effect into its decision
about whether exposure to a level of pollution threatens the public
health. BecauseJudge Williams invoked nondelegation principles as a
basis for this decision, 15 it is not one that Congress could override
simply by codifying the factors that the EPA had considered or reaffirming that the EPA had the discretion it assumed under the Clean
16
Air Act.
American Trucking can be interpreted as a judicial effort to require agencies to self-impose ex ante constraints on their discretion,
rather than as a traditional application of ex post judicial review. In
his opinion, Judge Williams notes that such ex ante constraints are
normatively desirable because they minimize arbitrary decisionmaking
by the agency, enhance the likelihood of meaningful judicial review,
and help to assure that government is responsive to the popular will. 17
Recent articles by Professor Cass Sunstein and Professor Lisa Schultz
Bressman also argue that the new nondelegation doctrine promotes
the values of the rule of law.' 8
14 See id. at 1034.
15 See id. at 1038 (acknowledging that ordinarily the nondelegation doctrine requires invalidation of the statute).
16 See id.
Where, as here, statutory language and an existing agency interpretation involve an unconstitutional delegation of power, but an interpretation without
the constitutional weakness is or may be available, our response is not to
strike down the statute but to give the agency an opportunity to extract a
determinate standard on its own.
Id.
17 See id. Judge Williams also noted these concerns in his earlier opinion in UAW
v. OSHA (Lockout/Tagout I), 938 F.2d 1310, 1313 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
18 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schechter Poultry at the Millennium:A DelegationDoctrine for the Administrative State, 109 YALE LJ. 1399, 1424-27 (2000) (defending the
approach of American Trucking and arguing for its expansion); Sunstein, supranote 8,
at 337 ("The nondelegation doctrine ...

promotes rule of law values."); id. at 350

("While constrained adminisrative discretion [under the new nondelegation doctrine] does not mean congressional lawmaking, it does tend to promote predictability, consistency, and visibility in law, and to ensure against ad hoc discretion by
administrators, discretion that might be exercised arbitrarily.").

20001

THE "NEW" NONDELEGATION

DOCTRINE

The rule of law serves several functions. First, it reduces uncertainty for those subject to the law, helping them to better plan their
affairs. 19 Second, it diminishes the likelihood of government "tyrarmy" by ensuring that government applies laws generally-ensuring
equal treatment for similarly situated individuals or firms, rather than
arbitrary treatment against those who might be disfavored at the moment.20

Third, the rule of law helps to assure political accountability

in the sense that, to be effective, rules must be known to the public,
21
which allows for political response to the rules.
In theory, separation of powers and the requirement that the legislative branch adopt rules of general application to govern behavior
of those subject to the government's power provide the primary
means for ensuring that our legal system reflects the rule of law. But
the demands of the modem state call for a more flexible government
structure that can gather necessary information about, and respond
more readily to, problems that may call for technical solutions and
quick action. Hence, dating at least to the beginning of the twentieth
century, and probably to the formation of the United States, executive
officials have been given discretion to develop the rules that govern
private behavior so long as they do so pursuant to statutes that give
them meaningful guidance about how to exercise that discretion.2
Once the reality that officials must be allowed to exercise such
discretion is recognized, there is no principled way for thejudiciary to
draw a line between allowed and prohibited delegations of rulemak19 See H.L.A. HART, Tim CONCEPT OF LAW 121 (1961) ("If it were not possible to
communicate general standards of conduct, which multitudes of individuals could
understand, without further direction, as requiring from them certain conduct when
occasion arose, nothing that we now recognize as law could exist."); sce also id. at
134-44 (same).
20 See RoNum, DwoRK, LAw's EhmmE 95-96 (1986) (noting that his theory of
"law as integrity" secures "a kind of equality among citizens that makes their community more genuine and improves its moral justification for exercising the political
power it does"); ef. HART, supra note 19, at 21 ("Legal control is... primarily, though
not exclusively, control by directions which are in this double sense gmeraV").
21 See LoN L. Fuux, Tim MORALriy OF Lcw 49-51, 92 (rev. ed. 1969) ("1 can
conceive.., of no emergency that would justify withholding from the public knowledge of a law creating a new crime or changing the requirements for making a valid

will.").

22 See United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 522 (1911) (upholding the Secretary of Agriculture's requirement that ranchers obtain a permit to graze sheep in
national forests); The Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch)
382, 387 (1813) (upholding an Act of Congress granting the President the authority
to declare whether either Great Britain or France had ceased violating the neutral
commerce of the United States, allowing that declaration to revise specified statutory
provisions).
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ing authority. Many commentators have recognized that the nondelegation doctrine is largely unenforceable by federal courts, because the
courts are unable to develop principled ways of enforcement.23 As
Justice Scalia has noted, the problem of excess discretion is one of

degree not type, 24 and unlike other questions of degree with which
the courts regularly deal, there are no 'Judicially manageable and defensible criteria for distinguishing permissible from impermissible
delegations." 25 Hence, except for several now-discredited cases decided in 1935,26 the Supreme Court has upheld all delegations of
rulemaking power to agencies that also exercise executive and judicial
27
functions.
The acceptance of legislative delegations to such agencies raises
the question of how to structure modem government to serve the interests that the rule of law means to further. Beginning in the late
1960s and through the 1970s, Professor Kenneth Culp Davis suggested
that courts allow broad delegations of legislative power, but that they
should also require agencies to provide standards to limit their own
decisionmaking discretion. In particular, Professor Davis advocated
that agencies should have to adopt rules and publicly announce principles that guide their choices in deciding particular cases, and
23 See Carl McGowan, Congress, Court, and Control of Delegated Power, 77 COLUM. L.
REV. 1119, 1128-30 (1977); Richard J.Pierce, The Role of the Judiciaryin Implementing
an Agency Theory of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239, 1244-47 (1989).

24 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring
and dissenting).
Once it is conceded, as it must be, that no statute can be entirely precise,
and that some judgments, even some judgments involving policy considerations, must be left to the officers executing the law and to the judges applying it, the debate over unconstitutional delegation becomes a debate not
over a point of principle but over a question of degree.

Id.
25 Richard B. Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 Ai. U. L. Rv. 323, 324
(1987); see also Richard J. Pierce, PoliticalAccountability and Delegated Power: A Response
to ProfessorLow 36 AM. U. L. REV. 391, 393-403 (1987); Stewart, supra, at 325-28.

26 See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935);
Panama Refining Co.v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
27 Some lower courts, however, have applied the doctrine to invalidate statutes.
See, e.g., South Dakota v. United States Dep't of Interior, 69 F.3d 878 (8th Cir. 1995),
vacated and remanded, 519 U.S. 919 (1996). The doctrine remains alive and well in
state constitutional jurisprudence, where high courts of several jurisdictions have held
delegations to be violations of state constitutions. See, e.g., Jim Rossi, InstitutionalDesign and the Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist Separation of Powers Ideals in the States, 52

1167 (1999) (discussing state courts' approaches to nondelegation and
providing an institutional design explanation for this distinct approach).
VAN. L. REV.
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thereby channel what otherwise might be unbounded discretion in
applying law. 28
Administrative law doctrine, however, generally has not followed
Professor Davis's suggestion. The Supreme Court has consistently
held that agencies can announce general standards that guide con-

duct in adjudications and then can apply those standards in the very
case in which the agency announces them.9 In addition, courts have
allowed agencies to liberally grant waivers of their rules and, in some
instances, have even upheld rules only because the agency has reserved the ight to grant such waivers. 30 The courts have consistently
favored ex post review over the ex ante standards Judge Wrlliams required in American Trucking.
To be sure, some cases have adopted aspects of Professor Davis's
call for agencies to limit their own discretion by setting standards ex
ante that will bind how the agency adjudicates particular cases. For
example, in Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union v. NLRB, 3 1 the
D.C. Circuit announced a balancing test for determining when an
agency abuses its discretion by changing policy in an adjudication and
then applying the new policy to conduct that occurred before the new
policy was created. 3 2 The court reversed the NLRB for applying a new
striker replacement policy to a company that had fired striking workers prior to the Board's announcement of the new policy in a previous
adjudication. 3 3 In addition, in a handful of cases, courts of appeals
have held that agency decisions that are not based on any ascertaina28 See KENNETH GuLP DAvis, DSCRmONARYJusricE A PpxmRunm" INQuiRY 50
(1969) (opining, with respect to the nondelegation doctrine and the rule of law, that
"the emphasis should not be on legislative clarification of standards but on administrative clarification"); Kenneth Culp Davis, A New Approad to Delegation,36 U. CHt. L

REv. 713, 713 (1969) ("The key should no longer be statutory words; it should be the
protections that administrators in fact provide, irrespective of what the statutes say or
fail to say."). Judge Friendly advocated a similar position, both in academic wor"ks and
published opinions. See, e.g., NLRB v. Majestic Weaving Co., 355 F.2d 854, 860 (2d
Cir. 1966); HENRYJ. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL AnuNwsTRArrv AcENCIES: THE NEED FOR
BrrER DEFINITION OF STANDARDS 5-6 (1962).

29 See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 295 (1974); SEC v. Chenery
Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202-03 (1947).
30 See Marshal Breger, Regulatory Flexibility and thw Administrative State, 32 Tuts\
L.J. 325, 335 (1996); Jim Rossi, Alaking Polcy Through tlw Waher of Regulations at the
FederalEnergy Regulatory Commissioi, 47 ADnuN. L. RE%% 255, 266 n.48 (1995); Mark
Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: FlexibleRegulation and Constraintson Agenty Discretion, 51
ADNmq. L. Ruv. 429, 441 (1999).
31 466 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
32 See id. at 390.
33 See id.at 393.
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ble standards violate the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. 34
But these cases are notable in large part because they represent adop-

tion of Professor Davis's approach only in extreme instances when an
agency ignores reasonable reliance interests created by its own prior
decisions, or when an agency gives absolutely no basis for its
decisions.3 5
Even the case that perhaps best supports the new nondelegation
doctrine, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally,3 6 does not hold that
agencies are bound by their previous policy determinations and interpretations of statutes.3 7 In Amalgamated Meat Cutters, the court rejected a traditional nondelegation challenge to the Economic
Stabilization Act of 1970, 38 which gave the President broad authority
to issue regulations and orders to stabilize wages and prices.30 Judge
Leventhal, writing for the three judge panel, stated:
Another feature that blunts the "blank check" rhetoric [of the delegation] is the requirement that any action taken by the Executive
under the law ... must be in accordance with further standards as
developed by the Executive. This requirement, inherent in the
Rule of Law and implicit in the Act, means that however broad the
discretion of the Executive at the outset, the standards once devel40
oped limit the latitude of subsequent executive action.
Judge Leventhal went on to explain the significance of the
quoted self-limiting aspect of executive and agency discretion as
follows:
[T]here is an on-going requirement of intelligible administrative
policy that is corollary to and implementing of the legislature's ultimate standard and objective. This requirement is underscored by
the consideration that the exercise of wide discretion will probably
call for "imaginative interpretation," leaving the courts to see
whether the executive, using its experience, "has fairly exercised its
34 See, e.g., Holmes v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 398 F.2d 262, 264-65 (2d Cir. 1968);
Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605, 610 (5th Cir. 1964).

35 In addition, it is noteworthy that while these cases remain good law, virtually all
were decided prior to the Supreme Court's reaffirmation that agencies can make policy via adjudication in NLRB v. Bel Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 269 (1974).
36 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971).
37 See id. at 748.
38 Pub. L. No. 91-379, 84 Stat. 799 (1970), amended by Pub. L. No. 91-558, 84
Stat. 1468 (1970); Pub. L. No. 92-8, 85 Stat. 13 (1971); Pub. L. No. 92-15, 85 Stat. 38
(1971) (expired 1974).
39 See 337 F. Supp. at 742-43.
40 Id. at 758.
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discretion within the vaguish, penumbral bounds" of the broad stat41
utory standard.
More importantly, the opinion clearly asserts that agencies are
free to change their approaches and policies regarding wage and
price controls if they can justify such changes. 42 In other words, the
agency is free to experiment with various policies and interpretations
of the statute so long as it provides intelligible reasons for why it chose
the policy it did in light of its statutory requirements and past
decisions.
This, however, is the essential requirement of ex post review of
agency decisions under the arbitrary and capricious standard. Instead
of requiring that the agency set some limits on its discretion ex ante,
judicial review acts to assure that the agency exercises its discretion
responsibly-that is, wisely and accountably.43 The courts have
adopted this approach by requiring agencies to engage in reasoned
decisionmaking enforced by ex post review of almost all agency exercises of discretion. 44
II.

TBE "NEiw" NONDELEGATION DocTRiNE AND TME RULE OF LAW

We disagree with the claim of Judge Williams, as well as Professors Sunstein and Bressman, that the new nondelegation doctrine better promotes the rule of law, especially when the doctrine is compared
to the ex post approach to judicial review that courts already use. In
terms of the three values underlying the rule of law-certainty, prevention of tyranny, and accountability-the new nondelegation doctrine provides little benefit. Unlike Professor Davis's original proposal
41

Id. at 759.

42 See id at 747-48.
43 See Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny ofthe FourthBranct:
Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agenty Decisions, 1987

DuxE LJ.387,428-30, 432 (contending that heightened scrutiny of agency reasoning
preserves both liberal values reflected in the Constitution and progressive values
which undergird the administrative state); Cass R. Sunstein, ConstitutionalismAfter the

New Dea4 101 HA.v. L. Rrv. 421, 470-74 (1987) (arguing that "hard-look" judicial
review constrains agencies from engaging in improperly motivated decisions).
44 The Supreme Court has stated that a rule
would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors which
Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that

runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it
could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
expertise.
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
43 (1983).
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that agencies operate pursuant to announced rules and standards in
making case by case decisions, the new nondelegation doctrine invalidates rules of general applicability that the agency has adopted.
These rules already provide the certainty that those subject to regulation need in evaluating whether an agency will tolerate their behavior. The new nondelegation doctrine does make it more difficult for
the agency to change course, because the agency is required to have
articulated a constraining interpretation prior to its promulgation of
rules. This creates some increase in certainty regarding the future
value of regulated entities' investments, but it does not provide any
additional certainty regarding what conduct is prohibited or allowed
by the rules. In fact, by threatening judicial override of such rules
based on judges' subjective evaluations that the discretion left by the
agency's interpretation of its statute is too unbounded, the new
nondelegation doctrine increases the uncertainty about whether regulated entities will have to comply with the rule. 45 As with the more
traditional nondelegation doctrine, the new doctrine allows courts to

override general legal requirements in a manner that is neither principled nor predictable.
The value of the new nondelegation doctrine as a means of
preventing tyranny is also suspect. The agency already has issued a
rule of law that applies generally to all that come within its letter. The
new nondelegation doctrine does not aim at ensuring neutral enforcement of such a pre-announced rule of law. Rather, it aims to
constrain agency discretion before the agency adopts general rules in
the first place. In other words, the only kind of tyranny the new
nondelegation doctrine might protect against is the possibility that an
agency will adopt rules of greater stringency for industries that the
agency arbitrarily disfavors. Current administrative law doctrine, however, already contains sufficient political and judicial checks without
the new nondelegation doctrine to guard against an agency manipulating the meaning of statutes to arbitrarily penalize disfavored industries. 4 6 In a rulemaking, were an agency to engage in such arbitrary
manipulation of factors made relevant by the agency enabling act, the
affected industry is free to participate in agency notice and comment
rulemaking proceedings and thus publicly to show the malevolence of
45

Cf. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation ofAmerican AdministrativeLaw, 88 HARIV.

L. REV. 1669, 1696-97 (1975) (making a similar point about the traditional nondelegation doctrine).
46 For a discussion of how agency procedures and their relationship to the three
constitutionally specified branches provide meaningful checks on agency decisionmaking, see generally Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic RepublicanJustificationfor the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARv. L. REV. 1511, 1541-62 (1992).
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the agency rulemaking. 47 The industry might then use this showing to
bring political pressure on the agency not to adopt the rule. If the
agency adopted the rule nonetheless, the industry could challenge
any such manipulation as arbitrary and capricious."8 Underjudicially
imposed requirements of reasoned decisionmaking, while an agency
is not precluded from varying how it applies the law from one rule to
49
the next, it must explain any such variation in that application.
Thus, even without the new nondelegation doctrine, agencies are constrained from arbitrarily changing the meaning of their enabling act
from rule to rule.
Increased accountability is probably the best argument for the
new nondelegation doctrine. Under the doctrine, an agency would
have to declare the meaning of a statute that granted the agency significant rulemaking discretion prior to engaging in any rulemaking
under that statute. Resolving the meaning of a statute that grants an
agency unbridled discretion usually will involve a discourse about the
relative weights and tradeoffs of various goals that prompted passage
of the statute. Thus, for example, when the Communications Act of
193450 authorized the FCC to issue broadcast licenses to further the
public interest, the Act left undecided whether the broadcast license
system should promote large, efficient broadcast companies, or
smaller stations that, although they would not reach as many listeners
or provide as slick programming, would devote attention to issues of
local concern. 5 1 The choice between these two visions of the United
47 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1994).
48 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994).
49 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 43 (noting agency's burden of explanadon); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800,
808-09 (1973) (explaining that the agency's ground for departing from previous decisions "must be clearly set forth so that the reviewing court may understand the basis
of the agency's action and so may judge the consistency of that action with the
agency's mandate"). Justice Breyer, while ajudge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit, explained this obligation:
[T]he Board remains free to modify or change its rule; to depart from, or to
keep within, prior precedent, as long as it focuses upon the issue and explains why change is reasonable. Unless an agency either follows or consciously changes the rules developed in its precedent, those subject to the
agency's authority cannot use its precedent as a guide for their conduct; nor
will that precedent check arbitrary agency action.
Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc. v. NLRB, 884 F.2d 34, 41 (1st Cir. 1989) (BreyerJ.) (citations omitted).
50 47 U.S.C. § 307 (1994).
51 See FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137-38 (1940) (describing Congress's intent to leave the FCC broad discretion under the public interest standard to
adjust regulation "to the rapidly fluctuating factors characteristic of the evolution of
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States broadcasting system was a value choice, not a decision that
flowed from the agency's technical expertise. Similarly, the relative
importance that the EPA should put on lives lost versus temporary
decreases in quality of life due to reversible illness is a value choice.
By forcing the agency to make such a choice from which the agency
could not vary in subsequent rulemakings, the new nondelegation
doctrine forces the agency to assess the value choices underlying its
rulemaking decision carefully. If one optimistically believes that making such value choices explicit will encourage public debate and input
in the rulemaking process, then the new nondelegation doctrine can
help ensure that the agency's ultimate decision on such choices is in
line with those of the nation's polity.
Unfortunately, there are reasons to believe that requiring the
agency to commit to a set of value choices independent of the context
in which they arise may undermine political accountability. Empirical
evidence suggests that even if agency value choices are explicitly revealed, the public does not engage in discussion about such choices;
rather, the public tends to focus on the bottom line acceptability of
the rules the agency adopts, not the value judgments that lead the
agency to those rules.52 Given this propensity of the citizenry to care
about rules rather than the value choices underlying those rules, the
new nondelegation doctrine could have the perverse effect of decreasing accountability. To illustrate how this might come about, consider
the EPA's setting of the ozone and particulate NAAQS. Suppose in
setting the first NAAQS, in order to satisfy Judge Williams's nondelegation concerns, the EPA provides an indication of the relative impact
of lives lost versus temporary but reversible inconvenience from disease. Suppose that compared to the values placed on these effects by
the populace, the EPA actually overvalues temporary inconvenience
and undervalues lives lost. Because of the precise impacts of the particular pollutant that the EPA addresses in this first NAAQS, the standard is the same as would have occurred had the EPA ascribed the
broadcasting"); Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393
(1965) (specifying criteria for awarding broadcast licenses that emphasize local ownership and management of radio stations).
52 See Robert B. Reich, PublicAdministration and Public Deliberation:An Interpretive
Essay, 94 YALE L.J. 1617, 1633-34 (1985) (noting the negative reaction William Ruckelshaus received in response to public fora he held to get guidance on how the EPA
should make value judgments, such as the balance it should strike between health
risks and unemployment, in setting a standard for airborne arsenic). While this also
may be true of congressional decisionmaking, it is not as problematic, because accountability of Congress is achieved through elections-where people can and do
focus on the bottom line-not review of Congress's justification for its laws.
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correct-that is popularly held-values to these impacts. Because the
bottom line rule is consistent with the public's values, and because the
public cares only about such bottom lines, there is no challenge to the
rule. The effect would be to commit the agency to an incorrect valuation of the effects of lost lives and temporary inconvenience from disease on the public health. The impacts of the next pollutant that the
EPA considers might be such that the incorrect valuation results in a
standard that the public finds unacceptable. But, because the agency
already committed to an interpretation of the statute that leads to this
standard, the agency is not free to set the second standard at a level
consistent with the underlying public values.
In the previous example, it is assumed that if the agency gets the
constraining interpretation wrong, in the sense of interpreting the
statute in a manner at odds with the values of the public, then the
agency cannot change its interpretation when it adopts the next standard, even if the agency could explain why its initial interpretation was
problematic. Were the agency free to change its interpretation, then
the new nondelegation would not provide any constraint on the
agency that arbitrary and capricious review does not already provide.5The point of this hypothetical is to illustrate that, because the public

cares about the rules adopted and not the value choices underlying
those rules and because the new nondelegation doctrine requires ex
ante constraints on how the agency resolves those value judgements,
agency rules may end up being less politically accountable.
In terms of accountability, perhaps even worse than the limitation
that the new nondelegation doctrine imposes on agencies' abilities to
respond to the public's assessment of its rules is the doctrine's impact
on the role of the courts in implementing regulations. The doctrine
empowers a court to invalidate an agency interpretation of a statute
when the presiding judges believe that the interpretation leaves the
agency too much discretion about how to implement the statute. But,
the issue of how much discretion an agency should have in implementing a regulatory scheme depends in complex ways on a host of
factors. It may be appropriate to give an agency discretion when the
regulatory context is so technical that those not well-steeped in that
context cannot appreciate the impact of various regulatory alternatives. It may be appropriate to give an agency discretion when the
53 At least one environmental law scholar has concluded that, despite Judge Williams's nondelegation rhetoric, American Truddng is really a rejection of the EPA's
rule as arbitrary and capricious. See Craig N. Oren, Run Over ly American Trucking
Part I: Can EPA Revive Its Air Quality Standards, 29 ENvri. L REP. 10,653, 10,657-58
(1999).
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statute identifies a public problem that all agree must be alleviated,
but the nature of the political system dooms congressional attempts to
solve the problem. It may be appropriate to give an agency discretion
when the subject of regulation changes too quickly for the Congress
to keep up by constantly updating statutes. These criteria for granting
agencies discretion cannot be reduced to some principle that courts
can then use to determine when and how discretion should be left to
the agency. Hence, the issues of how to structure agency discretion
and how much discretion to leave to the agency under any particular
statutory scheme are appropriately left to the political process. Allowing the judiciary to strike down otherwise reasonable interpretations of statutes on grounds that the interpretation left the agency too
much discretion invites judges-politically the least accountable government decision-makers-to substitute their inclinations for those of
the agency about the wisdom of the regulatory bottom line.
Moreover, as for prevention of tyranny, there is no need to promote accountability by empowering judges to strike down reasonable
interpretations of a statute just because the judges find the interpretation insufficiently constraining of agency discretion. In order for an
agency decision to survive ordinary ex post review under the arbitrary
and capricious standard, the agency must articulate how that decision
comports with its interpretation and understanding of the statute.
Hence, at some point, the agency must reveal its interpretation of the
statute, and that interpretation will be subject to judicial and political
oversight on the merits.
Some might contend that the lack of judicial accountability
under the new nondelegation doctrine is no different from that occasioned by courts striking down agency decisions under the arbitrary
and capricious standard. 5 4 But, judicial invalidation of statutory interpretation under the new nondelegation doctrine would be particularly difficult for the political branches to overcome. Agencies have a
variety of means to try to put in place policies that underlie rules that
courts initially strike down as arbitrary and capricious. An agency can
simply readopt the rule with a fuller explanation of why the rule
makes sense under the statute; 55 it can modify provisions of the rule
the agency considers non-essential to meet judicial demands on re54 See, e.g., RichardJ. Pierce, Jr., Two Problems in Administrative Law: PoliticalPolarity of the District of Columbia Circuit and JudicialDeterrence of Agency Rulemaling, 1988
DuKE L.J. 300, 302-03.
55 See William S. Jordan, III, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and CapriciousReview Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve Regulato2y Goals Through Informal
Rulemaking., 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 393, 424-27 (2000).
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view; 56 or it can implement the policy on a case-by-case basis, avoiding

problems of finding support for predictions of how the rule would
operate outside of the particular factual circumstances of the case
before it.57 Assuming that the new nondelegation doctrine is more
than merely arbitrary and capricious review in disguise, however, an
agency cannot recover from a decision striking an interpretation
under that doctrine without adopting a substantially more limiting interpretation of the statute or getting Congress to pass a statute explicitly adopting the rule that the court struck. rs
III.

THE

FLEXIBILTY

CosTs

OF THE NEW NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE

The analysis thus far has demonstrated that the benefits of the
new nondelegation doctrine, in terms of furthering the values underlying the rule of law, are at best minimal. Unfortunately, the costs the
doctrine would impose by decreasing agency flexibility in rulemaking
would be substantial.
Ex ante constraints on agencies are always imperfect, even if
those constraints are self-imposed by the agencies. 5 9 As proponents of
dynamic statutory interpretation have recognized, the meaning of a

statute that best furthers the goals underlying the statute may -vary because of changed circumstances and even changed preferences of the
polity.60 The Supreme Court has also recognized the need for agen-

cies to have flexibility in interpreting statutory terms that do not resolve a particular issue facing the agency. In Cheuron U.S.A. Inc. v.
NaturalResources Defense Counci461 the Court not only announced that
the judiciary should defer to permissible agency interpretations of
statutes that the agency administers, but also allowed the EPA to
change its interpretation of a provision in the Clean Air Act-a
56 See id. at 427-33.
57 SeeJim Rossi, RedeemingJudicialReview: The Hard Look Doctrineand FederalRegulatory Efforts to Restructure the Electric Utility Industr, 1994 Wis. L RE. 763, 801-06.

58 IfJudge Williams is serious that the new nondelegation doctrine responds to
an interpretation that fails to save a statute from being a violation of the traditional
nondelegation doctrine, see Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.d 1027, 1038
(D.C. Cir. 1999), then Congress would be powerless to adopt a statute that codifies
the agency interpretation, as that statute would, a fortiori, also violate the traditional
nondelegation doctrine.
59 For further discussion of the imperfections of ex ante constraints, see generally
Seidenfeld, supra note 46.
60 See generally W1nj.L% N. EsKRmcE, JR., D-nTaNu.: STATuToRy IN7'ERPRErrTio.
(1994); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L RE%,.
1479 (1987).
61 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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change that was prompted at least in part by the election of President
62
Reagan.
To understand how the new nondelegation doctrine would forfeit agency discretion, even if the agency exercises that discretion
responsibly, consider agency "interpretations" of vague statutory provisions intended to constrain agency decisionmaking. Under the new
nondelegation doctrine, the agency would have to adopt a binding
interpretation the first time it issues a rule pursuant to those provisions. But, at that time, the agency might not yet have discovered all
the factors that ultimately are relevant in applying the statute. For
example, returning to the ozone and particulate NAAQS illustration
from American Trucking, the EPA's experience to date with ambient air
pollution may indicate that transient, reversible health effects from
such pollutants are not significant compared with other effects. It
might therefore be tempted to interpret the impact on the public
health under the Clean Air Act to exclude such effects. Suppose, however, that ten years from now biologists discover an ambient air pollutant that causes some exposed individuals to have to be hospitalized
for years. The effect of the pollutant reverses itself completely after
several years, but in the meantime, the victim of the exposure is incapacitated. Under existing arbitrary and capricious review, the EPA
could include such significant reversible impacts in its public health
assessment, as long as it could show that these effects differ from those
of previously regulated pollution in a manner that justifies consideration of these reversible impacts. Under the new nondelegation approach, once the agency interpreted the statute to omit reversible
impacts, the agency could not take these unforeseen impacts into account without Congress amending the statute. Similarly, an agency
interpretation may reflect values that the polity no longer holds. As
medical improvements increase the quality of life for the elderly, the
EPA may want to increase the contribution of extending the life of the
old and infirm in its consideration of what constitutes a threat to public health.
IV.

APPROPRIATE MEANS FOR IMPOSING

Ex ANTE

CONSTRAINTS

We do not mean to suggest that ex ante constraints on agencies
are per se inappropriate. In order to ensure that agencies do not pursue values entirely at odds with those held by the polity, Congress
must be able to constrain agencies to remain true to any vision of the
agency role adopted by the legislature and to prevent the agency from
62 See id. at 862-64.
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exercising powers beyond those granted by the legislature. Ex ante
constraints, in the form of specific statutory provisions, play an important role in limiting agency discretion. 63 But, because the factors that
go into the determination of the appropriate extent and the means by
which agency discretion should be limited are essentially political
rather than legal in nature, imposition of ex ante limitations is best
left to political processes.6 The new nondelegation doctrine, as
much as the more traditional doctrine, contravenes this fundamental
tenet of administrative governance by vesting courts with authority to
determine when such agency-imposed ex ante limitations are sufficiently constraining.
It has been argued that the Supreme Court has already recognized the new nondelegation doctrine applied by Judge Williams in
American Trucking.6 5 The argument, advanced in an essay by Professor

Bressman in which she argues for wider application of the new
nondelegation doctrine, makes a novel link between the Supreme
Court's decision in AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Boardto and the D.C.
Circuit's recent decision in American Trucking.6 7 Professor Bressman's

link between the opinion in Iowa Utilities Board, written by Justice
Scalia, and the new nondelegation doctrine articulated by the D.C.
Circuit in American Trucking is at odds with Justice Scalia's previouslyarticulated concern with courts' abilities to enforce a constitutional
nondelegation doctrine.68 Courts, after all, will have the same problem articulating principles, whether they are evaluating the degree of
specificity provided by Congress or by an agency. Our analysis of the
normative underpinnings of the new nondelegation doctrine suggests
63 See Seidenfeld, supra note 30, at 446.
64 Cf.Jim Rossi, HamstringingState Agency Authority to PromulgateRules: A Questionable Way to Improve EnvironmentalRegulation, 29 Emvrt. L REP. 10,735 (1999) (arguing
that a recent Florida administrative procedure reform that requires the legislature to
provide more specific ex ante constraints but relies on courts to enforce these constraints does not enhance political accountability);Jim Rossi, "StatutoryNonddegation '
Learningfrom Forida'sRecent Approach to Administrative ProcedureReform, 8 WD:,tmJ.
PuB. L. 301 (1999) (same); see also Seidenfeld, supranote 30, at 453 (describing generally difficulties in using ex-ante constraints to change how agencies make policy
decisions).
65 See Bressman, supranote 18, at 1438-41.
66 525 U.S. 366 (1999).
67 See Bressman, supra note 18, at 1438-41.
68 See supra note 24. Prior to ascending to the bench, however, Justice Scalia
acknowledged that the doctrine may be worth reviving. SceAntonin Scalia, A ,Vote on
the Benzene Case, 4 REG., July/Aug. 1980, at 28 ("[E]ven with all its Frankenstein-like
warts, knobs and (concededly) dangers, the unconstitutional delegation doctrine is
worth hewing from the ice.").

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 76:1

little value to reinterpreting the case as anything but a Chevron step
two case. 69 Justice Scalia himself characterized Iowa Utilities Board this
way, finding the words "necessary" and "impair" in the Telecommunications Act of 199670 subject to more than one meaning. 71 At Chevron
step two, the Court did not defer to the agency, as it often does, but
found the agency's interpretation to be unreasonable, because the
language of the relevant provisions of the Telecommunications Act of
1996 precluded the agency's interpretation. 72 Justice Scalia did focus
on whether the rule contained a "limiting standard" and whether private actors, rather than the agency, would determine the terms of access. 73 Injustice Scalia's view, however, consideration of these factors
was not an implicit endorsement of a new nondelegation doctrine;
instead, the factors indicated that the agency had deviated from the
statutory criteria that Congress provided. 74 Justice Scalia thus recognized that the province of defining the bounds of agency discretion,
ex ante, appropriately belongs to Congress, not to the courts.
Although the analogy between portions ofJustice Scalia's analysis
and American Trucking seems plausible to the extent both cases focus
on statutory criteria, when viewed through the lens of nondelegation,
the cases take divergent approaches in the range of options they leave
for Congress. In Iowa UtilitiesBoard, the Court left open the possibility
69 In Chevronstep two, having determined that Congress has been silent or ambiguous with respect to the precise question at issue, a court determines whether the
agency's interpretation of what Congress has said is reasonable. See Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1983).
70 47 U.S.C. § 251(d) (Supp. 111994).
71 See Iowa Utilities Board, 525 U.S. at 388 ("We need not decide whether, as a
matter of law, the 1996 Act requires the FCC to apply [the incumbent's] standard; it
may be that some other standard would provide an equivalent or better criterion for
the limitation upon network-element availability that the statute has in mind."); id. at
397 ("Congress is well aware that the ambiguities it chooses to produce in a statute
will be resolved by the implementing agency...." (citation omitted)); see also id. at
428 (Breyer, J., concurring and dissenting) ("The Act expresses this last-mentioned
sharing requirement in general terms, reflecting congressional uncertainty about the
extent to which compelled use of an incumbent's facilities will prove necessary to
avoid waste.").
72 See id. at 392 ("Because the Commission has not interpreted the terms of the
statute in a reasonable fashion, we must vacate [the unbundled access rule].").
73 See id. at 388.
74 According to justice Scalia, the Commission's interpretation was "simply not in
accord with the ordinary and fair meaning" of the terms "necessary" and "impair." Id.
at 390. This was because the agency had not adequately supported its interpretation.
See id. ("In a world of perfect competition, in which all carriers are providing their
service at marginal cost, the Commission's total equating of increased cost (or decreased quality) with 'necessity' and 'impairment' might be reasonable; but it has not
established the existence of such an ideal world.").
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that Congress could authorize FCC discretion to adopt the very rule
that the Court struck down.7 5 The decision in American Trukding however, forecloses congressional authorization of the role the EPA
granted itself in NAAQS absent more specific ex ante constraints on
the agency's discretion. 76 Thus, the Supreme Court cannot be said to
have endorsed the new nondelegation doctrine applied by Judge WilHams in American Trucking.
CONCLUSION

The loss of flexibility might be a cost that the administrative system would be willing to bear if it had no other way to ensure that
agencies exercise their discretion responsibly. But Congress can enact
statutes that limit agency discretion ex ante and the courts already use
ex post review, under the reasoned decisionmaking standard, to check
against abuses of whatever discretion the agency retains. Such review,
coupled with political oversight by Congress and the President, has
worked somewhat effectively to check the prime candidates for agency
abuse: capture of the agency, undue political influence, and imposition of idiosyncratic agency values. Moreover, the new nondelegation
doctrine does not solve the problem, inherent in the traditional
nondelegation doctrine, of cabining the potential for inappropriate
imposition of judges' preferences. In short, the new nondelegation
doctrine provides little legitimate extra constraint at significant cost to
the regulatory state.

75
76

See id. at 397.
SeeAm. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. EPA, 173 F.3d 1027, 1047-48 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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